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I. INTRODUCTION 
Bargaining is all around us.  We are generally most familiar with 
bargaining when negotiating the prices, terms, and conditions of durable 
goods such as homes and automobiles.  Yet bargaining is how prices are 
set across a range of economic activities such as between licensors and 
licensees of intellectual property, employees and employers, content 
providers and distributors, health insurers and hospitals, and in many 
intermediate product markets.  However, unlike the standard economic 
paradigm of a single-price set through the interactions of supply and 
demand, understanding price in a bargaining setting involves a different 
set of tools and insights.  Economics has filled this void through the 
development of bargaining models that began in earnest with the dawn of 
mathematical game theory in the 1940s and 1950s.1 
Recently, bargaining has played a central role in a number of high-
profile antitrust matters.  In 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
challenged AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner—largely on the basis of 
a bargaining model that predicted the combined firm would have the 
ability and incentive to extract higher prices for its Turner Network 
television stations from downstream content distributors such as the Dish 
Network.2  In another example from 2018, the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission argued that Qualcomm’s market position in cellular chipsets 
allowed it to leverage higher royalty rates for its standard essential patents 
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 1. Seminal works include: JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THE THEORY OF 
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944); John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 
ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950). 
 2. See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 164 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 
1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).  Turner Network is comprised of ten cable channels: TNT, TBS, CNN, CNN 
Español, CNN International, Cartoon Network/Adult Swim, truTV, Turner Classic Movies, 
Boomerang, and HLN.  Id. at 179 n.7.  
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(SEPs), in violation of its commitment to license its SEPs on fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.3  Yet, bargaining 
models are certainly not new in antitrust.  They have been used in 
assessing hospital mergers as well as prior matters similar to the AT&T-
Time Warner matter, which involved bargaining between content 
providers and programming distributors—often labeled multichannel 
video programming distributors (MVPDs).4 
Yet, as we detail in this article, bargaining models have been unevenly 
adopted by the courts—particularly for vertical mergers.5  Further, a close 
cousin to bargaining models for vertical mergers, the vertical gross upward 
pricing pressure index (GUPPI), has yet to be formally adopted by the 
agencies.6  We explore the reasons why courts and agencies have yet to 
uniformly adopt these vertical versions of upward pricing pressures and 
simulation.  Ultimately, while the rationales of particular judges might be 
heterogeneous, uneven, and perhaps, at times, inconsistent with core 
economic logic, the fundamental point is that judges do not uniformly find 
the tools predictive and useful for determining the potential 
anticompetitive effects from vertical mergers.  Of course, some courts 
have adopted bargaining models, including for hospital mergers, which is 
the point of the analysis—to determine why there is such irregular 
treatment of these models. 
In this article, we assess the value of economic bargaining models to 
predict outcomes for both horizontal and vertical mergers and for 
unilateral conduct. To that end, we first provide an overview of the 
economics of bargaining models and their primary features, including the 
vertical GUPPI variant.7  We then discuss these models in the context of 
recent antitrust cases and detail the uneven judicial adoption of bargaining 
models.8  Next, we examine whether the current judicial reticence is 
 
 3. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 17-CV-00220, 2018 WL 5848999, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018). 
 4. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care, No. 15-C-11473, 2017 WL 1022015, 
at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2017) (discussing issues resulting from a hospital merger); Limelight 
Networks, Inc. v. XO Commc’ns, LLC, No. 3:15-CV-720, 2018 WL 678245, at *1 (E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 
2018) (reviewing objections to expert testimony for two content delivery networks in patent 
infringement litigation); Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 117 F. Supp. 3d 299, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(analyzing bargaining methods between regional sports networks (RSNs) and MVPDs); Behrend v. 
Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150, 179 (E.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d, 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 569 
U.S. 27 (2013) (discussing expert testimony in a class action against cable provider, Comcast). 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. The vertical GUPPI was proposed in Serge Moresi & Steven C. Salop, vGUPPI: Scoring 
Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical Mergers, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 185, 186 (2013).  
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
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justified.9  We review a body of emerging scholarship that suggest some 
caution on the use of methodologies to predict harm based on bargaining 
models.10  This suggests that a healthy degree of judicial skepticism is 
warranted—whether coherently articulated in opinions or not.  In 
conclusion, we offer some policy recommendations for the use of 
bargaining models, which we believe will lead to a more balanced 
approach regarding their use in antitrust matters.11 
II. THE ECONOMICS OF BARGAINING MODELS 
At its essence, bargaining is a method to set price and the terms of 
trade.12  Customarily, we consider a market economy as setting price 
through the interaction of demand and supply.13  While this is certainly 
true for many markets, Dov Rothman and David Toniatti succinctly make 
the point when they state “[p]rices are determined in different ways in 
different markets.”14  More specifically, in settings such as negotiations 
between content suppliers and distributors, insurance providers and 
hospitals, and wholesalers and retailers, prices are set through a bargaining 
process rather than through a market-wide determined price via supply and 
demand.15 
The central reason why two parties engage in bargaining is because 
there are “gains-from-trade.”16  However, predicting bargaining 
outcomes—even merely directionally—involves imposing some structure 
on the bargaining problem and process.  The fundamental problem that 
bargaining models are trying to solve is how the economic surplus from a 
 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See, e.g., Margaret Slade, Vertical Mergers: Ex Post Evidence and Ex Ante Evaluation 
Methods (Vancouver School of Economics, Working Paper, 2019); Gopal Das Varma & Martino De 
Stefano, Equilibrium Analysis of Vertical Mergers (Dec. 10, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3307150 [https://perma.cc/D42Q-JBSV] (unpublished manuscript); Gleb B. 
Domnenko & David S. Sibley, Simulating Vertical Mergers and the Vertical GUPPI Approach (Jan. 
1, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3447687 [https://perma.cc/3WC3-
GXC2] (unpublished manuscript); Christopher Garmon, The Accuracy of Hospital Merger Screening 
Methods, 48 RAND J. ECON. 1068, 1097 (2015). 
 11. See infra Part V.  
 12. Bargain, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english 
/bargaining [https://perma.cc/WTD2-M8VC] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020). 
 13. See generally Alfred Marshall, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890). 
 14. Dov Rothman & David Toniatti, A Primer on Bargaining: How Mergers May Affect 
Negotiated Prices, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2018, at 1, 1. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. (“There are gains-from-trade if the ‘gross benefit’ the intermediary gets from 
purchasing from the supplier is greater than the cost the supplier incurs in selling to the intermediary.”).  
1058 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
voluntary and mutually beneficial exchange is divided.17  Further, how do 
incentives and bargaining outcomes change when market conditions 
change, such as when there is a horizontal or vertical merger?  Put simply, 
bargaining models are methodologies, tools, and guidelines that 
economists use to put some order into the process of negotiation in terms 
of how to split the surplus or gains from trade resulting from a 
transaction.18 
Broadly, often the objective of bargaining models is not to derive a 
precise prediction regarding the agreed upon price—particularly given that 
price is only one of a variety of actual factors that parties bargain over.  
The reality is that almost all actual bargaining negotiations are 
multifaceted.19  Specifically, other terms that are relevant to a bargaining 
process—which ultimately could impact price in some manner—include 
the length of the contract, contingencies for risk, degree of asset specificity 
and investment, frequency of interaction, priority of access in times of 
shortages, insurance for non-delivery, exchange of technologies, and 
assurances of supply.20  Most bargaining models abstract from these 
complexities because their inclusion would naturally increase the 
complexity and information burden of these models.21  However, the fact 
that these complexities are not modeled does not mean they are irrelevant 
or that their omission does not impact the quality of the price predictions.  
Of course, there is an argument that, as applied to mergers, there is no 
reason to believe that these nonprice terms would change post-merger; 
consequently, we can still make an apples-to-apples comparison between 
the pre- and post-merger bargaining outcome.  While this argument is 
 
 17. See ALVIN E. ROTH, AXIOMATIC MODELS OF BARGAINING 1 (1979) (“If there are feasible 
outcomes which all the participants prefer to the disagreement outcome, then there is an incentive to 
reach an agreement; however, so long as at least two of the participants differ over which outcome is 
most preferable, there is a need for bargaining and negotiations over which outcome should be agreed 
upon.”). 
 18. Of course, bargaining and negotiations are topics that impact scholarship outside of 
economics including political science, labor relations, and business management.  See, e.g., Samuel 
B. Bacharach & Edward J. Lawler, Power and Tactics in Bargaining, 34 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 
219 (1981); Daniel Druckman, Negotiating in the International Context, in PEACEMAKING IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS AND TECHNIQUES 81 (I. William Zartman & J. Lewis 
Rasmussen eds., 1997); CHRISTOPHER VOSS, NEVER SPLIT THE DIFFERENCE: NEGOTIATING AS IF 
YOUR LIFE DEPENDED ON IT (2016). 
 19. See, e.g., P.D.V. MARSH, CONTRACT NEGOTIATION HANDBOOK 64 (3d ed. 2001) 
(“Negotiations for a contract are always multi-faceted, covering the price, delivery, specification and 
the key terms of contract.”). 
 20. See id. 
 21. See, e.g., ERNEST GELLHORN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 67 
(5th ed. 2004) (“Though merely theoretical constructs, structural economics models yield predictions 
about likely firm and market behavior.  These models are analytic tools, however, and they do not 
completely explain real world markets.”). 
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ostensibly appealing, it is a very strong assumption.22  Nonetheless, given 
that this line of research is relatively unexplored, we focus solely on 
bargaining models’ prediction on price. 
The origins of the modern thinking on bargaining is from Nobel Prize 
winning economist John Nash.23  Using an axiomatic approach, the Nash 
bargaining model predicts how a bargaining surplus is split in bilateral 
negotiations, which involves maximizing the (product of the) utility of all 
the parties involved in the negotiation.24  A central component of the Nash 
model involves an explicit incorporation of the disagreement outcome.25  
The Nash solution is the only solution that satisfied a series of axioms that 
Nash established, which includes conditions of symmetry, Pareto 
efficiency, invariance to transformations, and Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives.26 
There are a number of key aspects of bargaining models that are 
particularly relevant to antitrust applications, which we consider in this 
Part.  First, it is important to distinguish between two related, but distinct, 
terms: bargaining power and bargaining leverage.27  While these terms are 
often used interchangeably, it is important to make a distinction between 
the two concepts that they capture.  Second, it is important to distinguish 
between bargaining in the context of horizontal mergers, e.g., combining 
two hospitals, and vertical mergers, e.g., combining media content 
distributors and MVPDs.28  Finally, it is constructive to relate bargaining 
models for both horizontal and vertical mergers with their close cousins, 
the standard differentiated Bertrand model and the vertical GUPPI, 
respectively.29  In doing so, we will see that bargaining models and their 
 
 22. Moreover, the magnitude of the effects of these non-price variables could influence the 
magnitude of the predicted price change even if the non-price variables do not change post-merger. 
 23. John F. Nash, Jr., supra note 1, at 155.  The research on bilateral monopolies and bargaining 
goes back much further, however, and includes the work of economists such as Cournot, Edgeworth, 
Pigou, Schumpeter, and von Stackelberg.  For a history of the early literature on bilateral monopoly, 
see Fritz Machlup & Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical 
Integration, 27 ECONOMICA 101 (1960). 
 24. Machlup & Taber, supra note 23, at 103.  An axiomatic approach is essentially about defining 
a set of rules, or properties, that a solution must be consistent with and determining the potential set 
of outcomes that are consistent with those rules.  See, e.g., HANS J. M. PETERS, AXIOMATIC 
BARGAINING GAME THEORY 1 (1992) (“Axiomatic bargaining game theory is concerned with a 
mathematical investigation of the properties of such bargaining solutions. Usually, following Nash 
(1950), one formulates desirable properties for these solutions, and then tries to characterize a solution 
or a class of solutions by its properties.”). 
 25. Alvin E. Roth & Uriel G. Rothblum, Risk Aversion and Nash’s Solution for Bargaining 
Games with Risky Outcomes, 50 ECONOMETRICA 639, 640 (1982).  
 26. See Nash, supra note 1, at 156; see also ROTH, supra note 17, at 10–11. 
 27. See infra Section II.A.  
 28. See infra Section II.B.  
 29. See infra Section II.C. 
1060 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
close cousins have a great deal in common and rely on essentially the same 
set of assumptions and inputs.  Consequently, concerns regarding the 
adoption of vertical GUPPIs, for instance, generally translate into 
concerns regarding vertical bargaining models and vice versa. 
A. Bargaining Power vs. Bargaining Leverage 
Following Aviv Nevo and Matthew Grennan, we use the term 
“bargaining power” to describe a negotiator’s ability to extract more of a 
given level of joint surplus from a mutually beneficial exchange.30  This 
ability can be due to a variety of reasons, including superior bargaining 
skills and tactics, greater patience (modeled as a low discount rate for 
future payoffs), and less risk aversion.31  In contrast, we use the term 
“bargaining leverage” to describe how changes in the opportunity cost of 
striking a deal impacts the terms of the deal.32  In other words, bargaining 
leverage is based on the relative attractiveness of the best “outside option,” 
i.e., the payoff from not striking a deal.33  Other terms that are commonly 
used for the best outside option include the “disagreement outcome,” the 
“threat point” value, or “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” 
(BATNA).34 
As we describe further below, in the context of antitrust cases, 
bargaining power is typically assumed to be equal between the parties—
at least, this is the starting point of the analysis.  Thus, it is not a variable 
that is considered to change post-merger, and, consequently, does not 
contribute to the post-merger price prediction.  The origin of this 
assumption is that, in Nash’s original formulation, the negotiating parties 
both have the same utility function.35  Thus, for a given level of joint 
surplus, they split it evenly.36  For instance, in both the Comcast-NBCU 
and AT&T-Time Warner matters, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) and the DOJ, respectively, assumed that the upstream 
and downstream negotiating parties had equal bargaining power and split 
 
 30. Aviv Nevo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Mergers that 
Increase Bargaining Leverage, Remarks Prepared for Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 
and Cornerstone Research Conference on Antitrust in Highly Innovative Industries (Jan. 22, 2014); 
see also Matthew Grennan, Bargaining Ability and Competitive Advantage: Empirical Evidence from 
Medical Devices, 60 MGMT. SCI. 3011 (2014).  Matthew Grennan uses the term bargaining “ability” 
rather than “power.”  Id. at 3011.  
 31. See Nevo, supra note 30, at 4; Grennan, supra note 30, at 3020.  
 32. See Nevo, supra note 30, at 6. 
 33. Id.  
 34. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 1981). 
 35. Nash, supra note 1, at 159. 
 36. Id. 
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the surplus evenly.37 
For illustrative purposes, we can represent the buyer’s maximum 
valuation and seller’s minimum valuation from a deal as 𝑉! and 𝑉", 
respectively.  Further, we can represent the gains from trade as 𝐺 = 𝑉! −
𝑉".  Thus, if 𝐺 > 0, then we have a positive joint surplus and an exchange 
would be mutually beneficial.  Absent other considerations, both parties 
would engage in trade—irrespective of how the surplus is actually split.  
We would call this a “bargaining situation,” where parties have an 
incentive to cooperate but have some conflicting interests.38  It is worth 
emphasizing this fundamental principle of bargaining, where, even a very 
one-sided outcome would result in both parties being better off in terms of 
their utility.39  Of course, if we introduce non-pecuniary considerations 
such as the disutility from agreeing to a one-sided bargain, then it could 
change particular bargaining outcomes.40  Yet, bargaining models are 
intended to capture general, directional incentives, and the incentives are 
strong to engage in a transaction if there is “money on the table.” 
The next relevant question is in regard to the actual price at which the 
exchange will occur.  The feasible range for the price, 𝑃, can be 
represented as: 𝑉" ≤ 𝑃 ≤ 𝑉!.  Given this range, price is determined by the 
relative amount of bargaining power of the buyer and seller, 𝛼 and (1 −
𝛼), respectively: 𝑃∗ = 𝛼𝑉! + (1 − 𝛼)𝑉".  Assuming equal bargaining 
power, then 𝑃∗ = $
%
(𝑉! + 𝑉").  This assumption, however, is almost 
 
 37. See Expert Report of Carl Shapiro at 42 n.170, United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 
161 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Shapiro Report] (“Unless there 
is clear evidence suggesting otherwise, assuming that the gains from trade are split 50/50 is a 
reasonable and practical working assumption.  However, if one is not willing to make that assumption, 
then using the Nash Bargaining framework to predict the level of the negotiated price can be difficult, 
unless one has evidence regarding how the gains from trade are split.”); William P. Rogerson, A 
Vertical Merger in the Video Programming Industry: The Case of Comcast-NBCU, in THE ANTITRUST 
REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 534, 545 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. 
White eds., 6th ed. 2014) (“The FCC concluded that this was sufficient evidence to justify using an 
estimate of µ [bargaining strength parameter] that was equal to ½ for the case of national cable 
networks.”). 
 38. See Abhinay Muthoo, Bargaining Theory and Royalty Contract Negotiations, 3 REV. ECON. 
RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 19, 20 (2006).  
 39. An extreme example of this is the baseline bargaining model called the “ultimatum game,” 
where one party makes a single take-it-or-leave it offer to the other party.  In this game, two parties 
have valuations that would result in gains from trade, yet the party making the offer effectively takes 
the entire surplus as it is better for the other party to accept some small, nominal amount rather than 
nothing at all.  See WILLIAM SPANIEL, GAME THEORY 101 (2011).  Yet, experimental work within this 
simple ultimatum game indicates that actual outcomes deviated from theoretical predictions due to 
considerations such as perceived “fairness,” which manifested itself in players “punishing” the other 
player for asking too much—even if this reduced their own monetary payoff.  See Werner Güth et al., 
An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGS. 367 (1982). 
 40. See, e.g., Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and 
Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 211 (1995). 
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inevitably wrong,41 but it does not mean that it is not useful or a reasonable 
benchmark.  In the context of merger analysis, the nature of the work is to 
forecast the change in price, if any, from the acquisition.  If we assume a 
given level of relative bargaining power, there is no a priori reason to 
believe that it would change post-merger.42  Further, it assumes away 
socially unproductive bargaining behavior such as haggling, which can 
shrink the gains from trade—yet it remains a feature of real-world 
bargaining since there are private gains from engaging in it.43 
While bargaining power is often assumed to be evenly split, there are 
factors that can influence bargaining power, which are worth noting.  The 
first is the relative patience of the negotiating sides.  This is the central 
result of Ariel Rubinstein’s seminal work on bargaining.44  Rubinstein 
showed that in a game of repeated offers and counteroffers, with no known 
end period, the surplus is split based on the relative patience, or discount 
rates for future payoffs, of the participants.45  If the two sides are equally 
patient, then the result is approximately the Nash bargaining power 
assumption of a 50/50 split.46  Similarly, differences in risk aversion 
between the two sides can also influence the split of the surplus.47 
Given that bargaining power is 50/50 and that there are no changes to 
bargaining power post-merger, the focus then turns to changes in 
bargaining leverage.  Bargaining leverage, again, is based on the 
opportunity cost from not reaching an agreement.  It can also be considered 
 
 41. See, e.g., Grennan, supra note 30, at 3011 (“[T]he final negotiated price depends not only on 
the range of prices over which negotiation occurs but also on where firms end up within this range.  
This latter aspect has received less attention, despite the fact that it can be important, especially in 
cases where the range over which negotiations occur is large and firms vary in their bargaining 
abilities—the ability to reach a more favorable point within the range determined by costs, willingness 
to pay, and competition.”).  Looking at the coronary stent market, Grennan finds that differences in 
bargaining ability accounts for 79 percent of the variation in prices across hospitals.  Id. at 3018.  Also, 
as detailed below, litigation involving patent infringement and damages can involve assessments over 
the relative levels of bargaining power in order to make predictions about counterfactual bargaining 
outcomes.  See infra Part III. 
 42. Although, one concern is that the relative levels of bargaining power could conceivably 
influence the magnitude of the price prediction. 
 43. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS: MERGERS, CONTRACTING, AND 
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 28 (1987) (“Although this haggling is jointly (and socially) unproductive, it 
constitutes a source of private pecuniary gain.  Being, nevertheless, a joint profit drain, an incentive 
to avoid these costs, if somehow this could be arranged, is set up.”). 
 44. See Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97 
(1982). 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See Richard E. Kihlstrom et al., Risk Aversion and Nash’s Solution to the Bargaining 
Problem, in MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS AND GAME THEORY (Otto Moeschlin & Rudolf Henn eds., 
1981); Roth & Rothblum, supra note 25, at 639–47. 
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the “status quo” or “disagreement point.”48  The intuition is that the 
parties’ payoff from not agreeing to a deal influences the price of the 
actual deal.49  Outside options matter.  Nash explicitly incorporated the 
outside option into the utility function and optimization; however, we 
illustrate the concept using a more basic approach. 
Returning back to 𝑉! and 𝑉" to denote the buyer’s maximum and 
seller’s minimum valuation, respectively, from the deal, we can model 
changes in the outside option through changes in the valuation itself.  For 
instance, suppose that the seller, let us say an employee at a firm, receives 
a better outside offer for employment, where 𝑉"′ > 𝑉".  This shrinks the 
joint surplus range; thus, 𝐺′ < 𝐺.  Although the joint surplus has shrunk, 
it has a higher minimum due to the better outside option.  Assuming equal 
bargaining power, this will result in a higher price (or wage in our 
example).  Conversely, if the buyer no longer values the deal as highly 
(e.g., an employer could outsource some of their workers’ responsibilities 
offshore), then this will again shrink the gains from trade, and it will result 
in a lower price, all else remaining equal.  What this approach tells us is 
that, the more that a buyer values a transaction, the more likely the price 
will be higher.  Conversely, the less options that a seller has—or similarly, 
the lower its marginal cost—then the more likely the price will be lower.  
The value of the outside option is a central result of Nash’s seminal work 
and remains the bedrock of bargaining models.  It is the fuel to the 
predictions of bargaining models used in merger analyses. 
To more explicitly make the point in the context of media content 
creators and downstream content distributors, such as a streaming video 
service, suppose a buyer has an initial valuation of $10 per subscriber to 
engage in a deal to carry the seller’s content on the buyer’s streaming video 
service.  Let us further assume the seller must receive a price of $2 to cover 
its cost.  We would expect a price of $6 if the surplus is split evenly.  Now 
suppose that the buyer has another option to carry a channel very similar 
to the seller’s and has an offer on the table for $8 per subscriber from that 
alternative.  Now, the buyer is only willing to pay up to $8, so the range 
of prices to provide a mutually beneficial exchange has shrunk.  The price 
will fall to $5—again, assuming an equal split of the surplus.  The idea is 
that if there are a multitude of close substitutes, then the value of the 
outside option is relatively high.  Consequently, the buyer or seller does 
not feel a strong need to engage in a particular transaction at unfavorable 
terms. 
 
 48. See Ken Binmore et al., The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling, 17 RAND J. 
ECON. 176, 176 (1986). 
 49. Id.  
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A key point made by Schelling is that strategy “is not concerned with 
the efficient application of force but with the exploitation of potential 
force.”50  Thus, often the whole point is not whether a stick is actually 
yielded but the size and threat of the stick.  This is the point picked up by 
critics of the district court judge, Judge Richard Leon, in United States v. 
AT&T Inc.51  The criticism is that Judge Leon did not understand a central 
premise of bargaining models when he stated it was unlikely that AT&T 
would ever engage in a blackout because there had been no history of a 
long-term blackout.52  This is certainly a tempting critique because Judge 
Leon focused on the actual application of force rather than the potential 
exploitation of force, which is contrary to the key feature of bargaining 
models aptly described by Thomas Schelling.53 
In sum, bargaining leverage and how it changes, typically via a merger 
or through alleged anticompetitive conduct, is the central feature of 
antitrust bargaining models.  It is the primary engine that drives the 
anticompetitive price increase predictions.  The fundamental point is that 
changes in bargaining leverage are relevant regardless of whether the core 
antitrust allegation is horizontal or vertical, but there are differences 
between these two frameworks.  In the following sections, we provide an 
overview of bargaining models generally used to model horizontal 
mergers between hospitals and to model vertical mergers between video 
content providers and distributors. 
B. Bargaining Models for Horizontal Mergers: Hospitals 
After eight straight failed challenges to hospital mergers in federal 
court between 1994 and 2001, the FTC changed its economic approach 
and methods to analyze hospital mergers.54  Highly influential research 
that fueled this new approach includes works of Robert Town and Gregory 
 
 50. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 5 (1960). 
 51. 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 52. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, The AT&T/Time Warner Merger: How Judge Leon Garbled 
Professor Nash, 6 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 459, 463 (2018) (“Judge Leon understood that 
blackout threats are made in the context of programmer/distributor negotiations, referring to them as 
part of a ‘Kabuki dance’.  He also noted that they often try to determine the costs of a blackout.  
However, he nonetheless was skeptical [sic] of the bargaining leverage model because leverage is 
calculated on the assumption that failure to reach agreement would lead to a permanent blackout of 
the content being negotiated.  This conclusion also involves an erroneous analysis of bargaining 
theory.  The fact that permanent blackouts [sic] rarely if ever occur is not inconsistent with leverage 
theory.  The leverage theory is premised on blackout threats, not actual blackouts.”). 
 53. See id.; see also SCHELLING, supra note 50. 
 54. See Keith Brand & Christopher Garmon, Hospital Merger Simulation, AM. HEALTH LAW. 
ASS’N, Jan. 2014, at 1, 1–2. 
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Vistnes, and Cory Capps et al.55  The core intuition of Town and Vistnes’s 
bargaining model is premised on post-merger changes in bargaining 
leverage.56  Specifically, when two hospitals merge, the primary change to 
the bargaining situation—as it applies to the negotiation between the 
hospitals and insurance providers, i.e., managed care organizations 
(MCOs)—is that the merger will reduce the available substitutes to the 
MCOs if the bargain breaks down.57  In other words, the merged entity is 
more of a “must have” set, or bundle, of hospitals because there are less 
substitutes available to insurance providers, which reduces the threat point 
of MCOs.58  This assumes that hospitals negotiate in an “all-or-nothing” 
manner with MCOs and, consequently, only offer their system of hospitals 
as a single set rather than a la carte.59  This is a standard assumption; 
although, there are approaches that do not require an all-or-nothing 
bargaining position.60 
Further, an MCO’s post-merger bargaining leverage is determined by 
the impact on the MCO’s profit from (i) excluding a given hospital and (ii) 
including the next best substitute hospital.  Therefore, the more important 
a given set of hospitals are for an MCO’s revenues, the more bargaining 
leverage those hospitals will have.61  While the conceptual idea is 
straightforward, an empirical strategy is needed to actually make post-
merger price predictions from the change in bargaining leverage.  Town 
and Vistnes, and Capps et al. both adopt the willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
approach.62  At its core, WTP measures the value that a particular hospital 
brings to an MCO, which is a derived demand from potential and actual 
patients.  The data requirements to estimate WTP and post-merger changes 
in WTP involve patient-level inpatient discharge data, data on the merging 
 
 55. Robert Town & Gregory Vistnes, Hospital Competition in HMO Networks, 20 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 733, 733–53 (2001); Cory Capps et al., Competition and Market Power in Option Demand 
Markets, 34 RAND J. ECON. 737, 737–63 (2003). 
 56. Town & Vistnes, supra note 55, at 736 (“A hospital’s bargaining leverage with an HMO 
depends on the HMO’s alternatives to contracting with that hospital: the less profitable those 
alternatives, the greater the hospital’s bargaining power and the higher the price it can set.”). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., Deborah Haas-Wilson & Christopher Garmon, Two Hospital Mergers on Chicago’s 
North Shore: A Retrospective Study 8–10 (FTC Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 294, 2009); 
Garmon, supra note 10, at 1097.  
 61. Brand & Garmon, supra note 54, at 5.  The threat point for a set of hospitals “can be defined 
as the price at which its incremental profit under the agreement equals the profit associated with status 
as an ‘out-of-network’ provider.”  Id.  While the MCO’s threat point “can be defined as the price at 
which its profit under the agreement equals the profits it would earn marketing a network that does 
not include the hospital.”  Id. 
 62. See sources cited supra note 55.  
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hospitals as well as potential rivals, and hospital cost data.63  The goal is 
to use market-based data to capture the “value” that a particular hospital 
provides to patients in the surrounding area.  With estimates of WTP in 
hand, economists can then simulate the effect of a merger on prices. 
Importantly, the use of bargaining models is not the only approach to 
estimating competitive effects from hospital mergers.  Economists can 
also use a standard differentiated Bertrand model of competition.64  This 
structural approach was used by the FTC in its recent challenge of 
Advocate-North Shore in Illinois.65  Grennan notes that the differentiated 
Bertrand model is a special case of Nash bargaining where bargaining 
power is assumed to reside completely with the seller—in this case 
hospitals—and there is no price discrimination.66  In the following section, 
we will note a parallel situation for bargaining models used for vertical 
mergers, where the vertical GUPPI is a special case of Nash bargaining 
where bargaining power is assumed to reside completely with the seller, 
in that case video content creators. 
Whether using the WTP or the structural approach, the degree to 
which a merger impacts pricing is effectively the degree to which the 
merging parties are considered substitutes, which is determined by 
consumer preferences based on characteristics of the merging and 
alternative hospitals.67  Thus, even within a bargaining context, the 
assessment of a horizontal merger inevitably comes down to the closeness 
of substitutes between the two parties.68  The degree to which the relative 
bargaining leverage shifts post-merger, however, is clearly dependent on 
the size of the diversion ratio between the merging parties, to rivals, and 
to the outside good, i.e., all products outside of the relevant set of products 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Martin S. Gaynor et al., A Structural Approach to Market Definition with an Application 
to the Hospital Industry, 61 J. INDUS. ECON. 243 (2013). 
 65. See Steven Tenn & Sophia Vandergrift, Geographic Market Definition in Urban Hospital 
Mergers: Lessons from the Advocate-NorthShore Litigation, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2017, at 1, 1. 
 66. See Matthew Grennan, Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from 
Medical Devices, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 145, 160 (2013) (“[W]hen the hospital [in this setting the 
buyer] has zero bargaining ability . . . manufacturers [of medical devices] set prices in a Bertrand-
Nash price equilibrium; and when a manufacturer has zero bargaining ability . . . that manufacturer 
prices at cost.”). 
 67. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 35 (2006) (“For example, close head-to-head competition 
between two hospitals allows an MCO credibly to threaten both that it will contract with, and steer its 
patients to, only the other.  The elimination of such competition through a merger, therefore, can enable 
the hospitals to negotiate higher prices.”); Garmon, supra note 10, at 1076 (“Whether the post-merger 
negotiations are collective or separate, both of the merger effects are driven by the potential diversion 
between the merging hospitals, which is a measure of the substitutability of the hospitals in the eyes 
of the MCO’s members.”). 
 68. Garmon, supra note 10, at 1076.  
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under consideration.69 
C.  Bargaining Models for Vertical Mergers and Vertical GUPPIs 
The DOJ in both the Comcast-NBCU and AT&T-Time Warner 
matters used the same basic axiomatic approach to the bargaining 
framework—where “axiomatic” refers to modeling the outcome of the 
process rather than the actual mechanics of the negotiations.70  These 
models are considered strategic bargaining models.71  The two negotiating 
sides are the upstream content providers, i.e., channels, and the 
downstream content distributors, i.e., MVPDs, and the negotiations are 
over the per-subscriber-per-month (PSPM) fee or price.  Focusing on the 
AT&T-Time Warner matter, the government expert, Dr. Carl Shapiro, 
assumes that the two sides will split the joint surplus evenly and, thus, the 
price is determined by the Buyer’s Maximum price (𝑉!) and the Seller’s 
Minimum price (𝑉").72  If the gains (G) from trade is given by 𝐺 = 𝑉! −




(𝑉! + 𝑉").  If the merger increases the seller’s minimum 
price to 𝑉"′ where 𝑉"′ > 𝑉", then 𝑃&)*+∗ =
$
%
/𝑉! +	𝑉"′1 where 𝑃&)*+∗ >
𝑃&'(∗ .  More precisely, the increase in price is ∆𝑃 =
$
%
(𝑉"′ − 𝑉").  This is 
the central basis as to how a better outside option increases the predicted 
price.73 
Why would the seller’s outside option be better post-merger?  The 
core intuition is that, post-merger, a combined AT&T-Time Warner has a 
higher opportunity cost from striking a deal with downstream competitors 
such as Dish Network.  Before the merger, if Time Warner struck a deal 
with Dish Network, then the full costs and benefits of the deal are 
“internal” to Time Warner.  However, post-merger, a deal with Dish 
Network actually causes a negative externality onto the larger AT&T 
 
 69. Brand & Garmon, supra note 54, at 3 n. 6 (noting that diversion ratio is conventionally 
measured as the percentage of lost output that flows from one product to another after a marginal 
increase in price, but that in the context of hospitals patients generally “pay” through insurance, and 
concluding, “[i]n hospital markets, if marginal changes in prices do not affect admission patterns, the 
diversion ratio from hospital A to hospital B is defined as the expected share of volume (e.g., 
discharges) captured by hospital B if hospital A is excluded from a network”). 
 70. For more on this distinction, see Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive 
Effects of Horizontal Mergers II: Auctions and Bargaining, in 2 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND 
POLICY 1343 (Wayne Dayle Collins et al. eds., 2008). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Shapiro Report, supra note 37, at 41. 
 73. See, e.g., id. at 46 (“The Nash Bargaining model predicts that the Turner fees paid by Dish 
will rise because AT&T’s post-merger Seller Min for the Turner Content licensed to Dish will be 
higher than Time Warner’s pre-merger Seller Min for the Turner Content licensed to Dish.”). 
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corporation—outside of the Time Warner division—since it hurts AT&T’s 
DirecTV product which competes with Dish Network.  Alternatively, a 
combined AT&T-Time Warner is harmed less if it does not strike a deal 
with Dish Network because the loss in licensing revenues is mitigated by 
some Dish Network customers switching over to DirecTV, which clearly 
benefits the combined entity.  Critical to Dr. Shapiro’s model is the 
assumption that the Seller’s Minimum price is based on a blackout.74 
Even if the economic profit from a blackout changes post-merger, the 
question becomes “how much?”  The primary variables needed to make 
this calculation are the margins at DirecTV; the elasticity of demand at 
rival MVPDs if they lose Turner Network content; and the diversion ratio 
from rival MVPDs to DirecTV.75  The precise formula for the price 
increase is given in Dr. Shapiro’s Report, Appendix G, equation 19:76 
∆𝑤, ≡ 𝑤,∗ −𝑤, = (1 − 𝛼)(𝑝- − 𝑐- −𝑤-)𝛾,-𝐿9 
In the above formula, ∆𝑤, is the post-merger change in the price to a 
rival such as Dish Network; 𝛼 is the Nash bargaining power parameter that 
is assumed to be ½; (𝑝- − 𝑐- −𝑤-) is the margin that AT&T gets at 
DirecTV per subscriber; 𝛾,- is the diversion ratio from Dish Network to 
DirecTV; and 𝐿9 is the constant annual subscriber loss rate from Dish 
Network.  Thus, the price prediction effectively comes down to margins, 
diversions, and demand elasticity.77 
Similarly, in the Comcast-NBCU matter, the FCC’s bargaining model 
was based primarily on a post-merger change in the opportunity cost of 
the merged firm continuing to supply the downstream rival.78  In 2009, the 
Comcast Corporation announced the acquisition of NBC Universal 
(NBCU).79  The vertical part of the deal involved combining Comcast’s 
cable services with NBCU’s suite of channels.80  As a forerunner to the 
model used in the AT&T-Time Warner matter, the FCC derived the 
following predicted increase in programming price due to the merger:81 
∆𝑤 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑚𝛾𝐿 
In the above formula, ∆𝑤 is the post-merger change in the price to 
 
 74. Id. at 126.  
 75. Id. at 49–50. 
 76. Id. at 137 (app. G, equation 19). 
 77. Id. at 136.  
 78. See Rogerson, supra note 37. 
 79. See, e.g., Tim Arango & Brian Stelter, Comcast Receives Approval for NBC Universal 
Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/19/business/media/19 
comcast.html [https://perma.cc/BB5F-2SGT]. 
 80. These channels included, inter alia, NBC, USA, SyFy, MSNBC, CNBC, and Bravo. 
 81. The formula is from Rogerson, supra note 37, equation 4.  The notation has been slightly 
changed to more closely match Dr. Shapiro’s notation in AT&T-Time Warner; see also Shapiro 
Report, supra note 37, at 41. 
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rivals to Comcast; 𝛼 is the Nash bargaining power parameter that is 
assumed to be ½; 𝑚 is the profit margin that Comcast gets per subscriber; 
𝛾 is the diversion ratio from competitors to Comcast; and 𝐿 is the departure 
rate from rivals if NBCU content became unavailable.  Again, the price 
prediction effectively comes down to margins, diversions, and demand 
elasticity when content becomes unavailable. 
Note that both the AT&T-Time Warner and Comcast-NBCU matters 
involved a consideration of a second theory of harm, which is that post-
merger, the integrated vertical entity would have the incentive and ability 
to completely foreclose—either temporarily or permanently—MVPDs.82  
This theory of harm can easily be folded into the bargaining framework.  
If the integrated firm’s profit from foreclosure (𝜋.
&)*+) is greater than the 
profit from the post-merger anticipated bargaining outcome (𝜋/∗
&)*+), then 
the integrated firm will foreclose rival MVPDs. 
In essence, accepting the vertical bargaining models presented by 
federal agencies in recent court decisions is the same as accepting that all 
vertical mergers with similar structural conditions as the AT&T-Time 
Warner and Comcast-NBCU matters have a gross upward pricing 
pressure.  As Gopal Das Varma and Martino De Stefano state, “[a]ll three 
numbers [margins, diversions, and departure rate] are typically positive.  
The technique is, thus, hardwired to predict a wholesale price increase.”83  
This echoes the framework advanced by Steven Salop and Serge Moresi, 
in which they developed a number of vertical gross upward pricing 
pressure indices (vGUPPIs).84  Like its horizontal counterpart,85 vGUPPIs 
are intended to provide a measure of pricing “pressure,” i.e., the strength 
of the incentive, to raise price, although it is not necessarily a price 
prediction per se.86  The framework involves the calculation of three 
indexes.87  The first index is vGUPPIu, which is the pricing incentive of 
the upstream firm.88  The informational requirements are primarily the 
diversion ratio from the upstream firm to the downstream firm and the 
 
 82. See Rogerson, supra note 37, at 540; see also Shapiro Report, supra note 37, at 86–87. 
 83. Varma & De Stefano, supra note 10. 
 84. Serge Moresi & Steven C. Salop, vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical 
Mergers, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 185 (2013). 
 85. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 20–
21 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/804291/100819hmg.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A4C7-4DTQ].  
 86. See generally Moresi & Salop, supra note 84.  Although, price predictions can be made under 
certain assumptions regarding the shape of the demand curve. 
 87. Id. at 191. 
 88. Id. at 192–95. 
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downstream margin of the merging firm.89  The vGUPPIu will always be 
a positive number (assuming nonzero values for margins and diversions) 
and the most analogous to the prediction of bargaining models of an 
increase in the upstream firm’s price to downstream rivals.90  The second 
index is vGUPPIr, which is the pricing incentive of the downstream rival.91  
The primary informational requirement is the pass-through rate of the 
upstream firm’s cost changes on downstream prices.92  Again, vGUPPIr 
will be a positive number with the intuition that a higher input price to 
rivals will cause them to raise their own prices to consumers.93  The final 
index is vGUPPId, which is the pricing incentives of the downstream 
merging firm.94  The informational requirements are primarily the 
diversion ratio from the downstream firm to the upstream firm and the 
upstream margin.95  Notwithstanding the downward pricing pressure from 
the elimination of double marginalization (EDM), the vGUPPId will also 
be positive since a price increase by the integrated firm’s downstream unit, 
e.g., DirecTV, will benefit the upstream unit, i.e., Turner Network, 
because it will lead to an increase in sales to rivals due to diverted sales.96 
In sum, both bargaining models (for vertical mergers) and vGUPPIs 
effectively take departure rates, diversion ratios, and relative margins into 
account to simulate the incentive to engage in a strategy to raise rivals’ 
costs.  This makes the two approaches very close cousins.  A critical 
difference, however, is that the vGUPPI framework assumes that 
“manufacturers have no bargaining power over input prices”;97 in other 
words, all the bargaining power lies with the upstream input supplier.  
Moreover, the vGUPPI indicia are arguably more “complete” in that they 
account for more potential post-merger pricing effects—namely from the 
integrated downstream unit and rivals to that unit.  Thus, what vGUPPIs 
are to bargaining models for vertical media mergers are analogous to what 
standard differentiated Bertrand models of competition are to bargaining 
models for horizontal hospital mergers. 
 
 89. See id.  The diversion ratio from the upstream firm to the downstream firm is closely related 
to the diversion ratio between the downstream rival (e.g., Dish) to the firms’ downstream firm (e.g., 
DirecTV). 
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. at 195–97. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. at 197–99. 
 95. See id.  The diversion ratio from the downstream firm to the upstream firm is again closely 
related to the diversion ratio between the downstream rival (e.g., Dish) to the firms’ downstream firm 
(e.g., DirecTV). 
 96. See id. 
 97. Id. at app. n.1, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_law 
_journal/at_alj_moresi_salop.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GE2-F4TK].  
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D. Comparing Bargaining Models for Horizontal and Vertical Mergers 
Before turning to how courts have received and interpreted economic 
bargaining models in various contexts, we briefly compare and contrast 
the WTP bargaining models used for hospital cases and the bargaining 
models used in the Comcast-NBCU and AT&T-Time Warner matters.  
The most important similarity is that both involve a post-merger change in 
bargaining leverage, which is the genesis for the predicted post-merger 
price increase.  For hospital mergers, the bargaining change is analogous 
to having a better bundle of products with more hospitals in the offer set—
assuming “all-or-nothing” bargaining.  This reduces the set of outside 
options (in terms of substitute hospitals) for MCOs, which increases the 
bargaining leverage of the merging hospitals.  This allows the hospitals to 
extract more of the bargaining surplus post-merger.  For media mergers, 
the bargaining change is that higher input prices to downstream rivals can 
result in an additional benefit to the integrated firm in the form of greater 
sales to the newly acquired downstream unit (due to diverted sales).  In 
other words, it is posited that the opportunity cost of dealing with 
downstream rivals has increased post-merger. 
Thus, while both types of models share the same change in bargaining 
leverage, they differ as to why the leverage changes and how that change 
manifests into a price increase.  For horizontal hospital mergers, it is due 
to the standard antitrust result that the acquisition of a close substitute 
affords the merged entity greater market power.  For vertical media 
mergers, it is due to the calculation that the total profits over the entire set 
of complementary goods in a value chain are higher with a higher post-
merger price. 
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III. USE OF BARGAINING MODELS IN ANTITRUST CASES 
The use of bargaining models in antitrust matters essentially comes 
down to comparing counterfactuals, as it does with all models of 
competition.  For horizontal mergers, the foundational change is that the 
merged entity now internalizes some of the sales loss if it raises price(s) 
on one or both of the products—assuming some positive level of diversion 
between them.98  For vertical mergers, the vertically integrated firm now 
owns complementary assets at two or more levels of the supply chain. 
In this Part, we review a number of recent cases involving judicial 
assessments of bargaining models, focusing on how courts have 
adjudicated these issues.  Broadly, the courts’ inquiries follow a typical 
pattern.  First, does the proposed bargaining model capture the full flavor 
and contours of a particular market?  Second, are there reliable sources for 
the inputs needed to generate predictions from the model?  Third, is there 
some external validity to the predictions in terms of actual market-based 
evidence? 
Ultimately, we generally find that courts struggle with applying the 
abstractions of bargaining models to the facts particular to their case.  
Moreover, courts are reticent to adopt the predictions from these models 
without some other evidence to validate the predictions.  While 
abstractions are inherent to all economic models to one degree or another, 
the level involved with axiomatic bargaining models (i.e., bargaining 
models that do not model the actual mechanics of the bargaining process 
but rather arrive at a prediction through properties that the equilibrium 
must satisfy) and their primary focus on measuring changes in bargaining 
leverage have left the courts uncertain as to their predictive merits.  This 
does not mean, however, that all courts reject the models.  Particularly for 
hospital mergers, judges have embraced the models as standard and 
reliable analyses.  However, particularly for vertical media mergers, their 
acceptance has been significantly more uneven. 
Below, we review the use of bargaining models in seven cases running 
from 2010 through 2018.  The first three, VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Systems, 
Inc., Limelight Networks, Inc. v. XO Communications, LLC, and FTC v. 
Qualcomm, Inc., involve patent royalty disputes where the court is asked 
to determine the counterfactual bargaining outcome.99  The fourth case, 
FTC v. Advocate Health Care, is the most recent hospital merger that has 
 
 98. Alternatively, the merged entity could discontinue one of the merged products.  This is just a 
special case where the price increase on the discontinued product is infinite. 
 99. VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Limelight Networks, 
Inc. v. XO Commc’ns, LLC, No. 3:15-CV-720-JAG, 2018 WL 678245 (E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 2018); FTC 
v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
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been challenged in court.100  The last three cases, Laumann v. National 
Hockey League, Behrend v. Comcast, and AT&T,101 involve media 
markets and bargaining between the upstream content suppliers and 
downstream content distributors.102 
A.  VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. 
In VirnetX, although the Federal Circuit did not directly invoke an 
antitrust issue, the case involved assessment of a reasonable royalty rate 
from a patent infringement dispute between VirtnetX, the patent holder, 
and Cisco and Apple, the alleged patent infringers.103  Central to this 
assessment was whether a Nash bargaining model was a reliable and 
appropriate framework to estimate the royalty rate.104  Specifically, the 
issue was whether the Nash bargaining assumption of a 50/50 split was a 
reliable starting point for the bargaining solution.105  At trial, VirtnetX’s 
damages expert, Roy Weinstein, offered various approaches to calculate a 
reasonable royalty rate, which the district court had admitted over Apple’s 
Daubert motion to dismiss the testimony.  Under one of the approaches, 
Weinstein testified that “the parties [would have] split between themselves 
the incremental or additional profits that are associated with the use of the 
patented technology.”106  As the appellate judge further explained, 
“[w]ithout examining the applicability to this case of all the preconditions 
for the Nash Bargaining Solution,” Weinstein “modified that result by 
10%, explaining that VirnetX would have received only 45% of the profit 
because of its weaker bargaining position, leaving 55% for Apple.”107 
In deciding on the admissibility of the Nash bargaining model and 
solution, the court cited a number of district court cases that rejected the 
50/50 Nash bargaining power assumption.108  Nonetheless, the court also 
cited a number of cases that had admitted the 50/50 Nash bargaining 
solution under various rationales, including, that it was used only “as a 
 
 100. FTC v. Advocate Health Care, No. 15C11473, 2017 WL 1022015 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2017). 
 101. Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 117 F. Supp. 3d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Behrend v. Comcast 
Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150 (E.D. Pa. 2010); United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 164 (D.D.C. 
2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 102. We do not discuss Comcast-NBCU because the matter was settled before a court decision. 
 103. VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 104. Id. at 1325. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1331–32; see also Robocast, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 10-1055-RGA, 2014 WL 
350062 (D. Del. Jan. 29, 2014); Dynetix Design Sols. v. Synopsys, Inc., No. C11-5973, 2013 WL 
4538210 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 
2011). 
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check” to other analyses, that it was applicable to the specific facts of the 
case, and that defendants had not challenged its admissibility.109  
Ultimately, the court rejected the Nash bargaining solution and found it 
inadmissible under Daubert to approximate a reasonable royalty rate for a 
hypothetical negotiation.110  This rejection was central to the court’s 
decision to vacate the damages award and remand the case for further 
proceedings.111  The court’s primary rationale was that the: 
Nash theorem arrives at a result that follows from a certain set of 
premises.  It itself asserts nothing about what situations in the real world 
fit those premises.  Anyone seeking to invoke the theorem as applicable 
to a particular situation must establish that fit, because the 50/50 profit-
split result is proven by the theorem only on those premises.112 
B. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. XO Communications, LLC  
In Limelight Networks—a case with parallels to VirnetX, but with an 
important difference—two parties, Limelight and Akamai, were involved 
in a patent infringement suit where “they cross-allege[d] patent 
infringement violations based on their competing products.”113  Each party 
provided an economic expert to calculate damages.114  Plaintiff’s expert, 
Dr. Stephen Prowse, attempted to present a reasonable royalty estimation 
for Limelight’s patents by “creating a hypothetical negotiation between 
the parties to estimate what Akamai would have negotiated to pay 
Limelight for a license on the patents instead of infringing.”115  Rather than 
using the Nash bargaining power assumption of 50/50 as a starting point, 
however, Prowse used the bargaining model developed by Rubinstein,116 
which involves assessing the relative patience of each party in a 
negotiation to determine how a surplus is ultimately split.117  Prowse used 
“each company’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC) as a proxy for 
 
 109. VirnetX, 767 F.3d at 1332; see also Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., No. 
C08-04990, 2012 WL 1142537, at *3 n.19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012); Gen-Probe Inc. v. Becton 
Dickinson & Co., No. 09-CV-2319, 2012 WL 9335913, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2012); Sanofi-
Aventis Deutschland GMBH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., No. 07-CV-5855, 2011 WL 383861, at *13 
(D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2011); Amakua Dev. LLC v. Warner, No. 05C3082, 2007 WL 2028186, at *20 (N.D. 
Ill. July 10, 2007). 
 110. VirnetX, 767 F.3d at 1332–34.  
 111. Id. at 1334. 
 112. Id. at 1332. 
 113. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. XO Commc’ns, LLC, No. 3:15-CV-720, 2018 WL 678245, at *4 
(E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 2018). 
 114. Id. at *2. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at *2–3. 
 117. Rubinstein, supra note 44, at 97.  
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each party’s relative patience.”118  This is particularly noteworthy because 
the WACC is also what the DOJ’s expert, Dr. Carl Shapiro, used in the 
AT&T-Time Warner matter to measure relative levels of patience.119 
Judge John Gibney was unconvinced, however, and stated that 
“Prowse’s method is simply fancy guesswork.”120  Echoing the rationale 
of the VirnetX court, Judge Gibney explained that the bargaining model 
“contain[ed] almost no basis in facts relevant to this case;”121 specifically, 
he reasoned that “[u]sing WACC as a proxy for patience in the Rubinstein 
model does not consider the actual stakes in the hypothetical negotiation 
or even the specific patents negotiated.”122  The judge further emphasized 
that the issue was not whether Prowse chose the right or wrong WACC 
measure, but whether the WACC measure was relevant at all to inform a 
jury on “how the parties would negotiate over these patents.”123 
C. FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc. 
In Qualcomm, the FTC alleged that Qualcomm engaged in 
anticompetitive practices to raise its royalty rates for its standard essential 
patents (SEPs) above a fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) 
rate and that Qualcomm anticompetitively excluded rivals through use of 
exclusive contracts.124  At the heart of the FTC’s case are two licensing 
policies that Qualcomm historically has used to license its SEPs.125  First, 
Qualcomm has a “no license, no chips” policy.126  Qualcomm will not sell 
its modem chipsets, which are used to send data between the mobile 
devices and the cellular network, to mobile device original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs), such as Apple and Samsung, without first having 
a royalty agreement in place for its SEPs.127  The rationale is that the SEPs 
 
 118. Limelight Networks, 2018 WL 678245, at *3.  
 119. See Shapiro Report, supra note 37, at 42 (“In practice, the relative discount rates can be 
approximated by a relative measure of the cost of capital for the two negotiating parties.  Indeed, when 
I follow industry practice, and use the weighted average cost of capital (‘WACC’) to approximate the 
discount rates of different MVPDs, I find that AT&T and any of its rival MVPDs would split the gains 
from trade equally or nearly equally.”).  Here, Shapiro is using both the Nash bargaining assumption 
of a 50/50 split and a Rubinstein framework to validate that assumption. 
 120. Limelight Networks, 2018 WL 678245, at *3.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id.  
 124. FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 669 (N.D. Cal. 2019).  
 125. Id. at 671–72. 
 126. Id. at 703. 
 127. Id. at 675. 
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cover the intellectual property embodied in the chipsets.128  Second, 
Qualcomm only licenses its SEPs to device-level OEMs rather than rival 
component-level chipset suppliers.129  A central justification for this 
industry-wide approach to licensing at the device-level, rather than the 
component-level, is that it undoubtedly minimizes transaction costs.130 
The FTC alleged that these licensing policies allowed Qualcomm to 
“tax” rival chipset suppliers—i.e., effectively engage in a margin squeeze 
(although, the FTC appears to take great pains to avoid this label).131  The 
mechanism of the harm is that the “no license, no chips” policy allows 
Qualcomm to obtain supra-FRAND royalty rates for its SEPs.132  OEMs 
do not challenge the supra-FRAND rates in arbitration because of 
Qualcomm’s bargaining leverage.133  The thought is that if OEMs 
challenge the royalty rates, then Qualcomm will withhold its chipsets;  as 
a result, the OEMs would be unable to ship their mobile devices.134  To 
avoid this undesired outcome, the OEMs simply pay the supra-FRAND 
rates.135  In turn, this “taxes” Qualcomm’s chipset rivals because OEM 
margins are squeezed by the elevated royalties and, consequently, OEMs 
demand lower chipset prices from rivals.136  Since chipset rivals do not 
have the lucrative supra-FRAND royalties like Qualcomm to subsidize 
their operations, these rivals are unable to compete because, effectively, 
their margins are squeezed.137 
This tax theory emerges from the bargaining model developed by the 
FTC’s economic expert, Dr. Carl Shapiro, which is similar to the 
increased-leverage theory advanced by Dr. Shapiro and the DOJ in the 
AT&T-Time Warner matter.138  The general idea is that a company that 
operates two complementary business units can leverage market power in 
 
 128. More specifically, rather than “bundling” the actual physical components of the modem 
chipset with the intellectual property into a “single price,” Qualcomm separately negotiates the price 
for the modem chipset and the royalties for the intellectual property that is used in the modem chipset. 
Id. at 713.  
 129. Id. at 755. 
 130. By licensing at the device-level, it allows SEP holders such as Qualcomm, Nokia, and 
Ericsson to negotiate with only one party rather than multiple parties throughout the supply chain, and, 
importantly, it avoids the technically difficult and often infeasible exercise of determining which SEP 
goes to which level of the supply chain. 
 131. See Lindsey M. Edwards, Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Section 2 Mangled: 
FTC v. Qualcomm on the Duty to Deal, Price Squeezes, and Exclusive Dealing (Geo. Mason Univ. 
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 19-21, 2019). 
 132. Id. at 15–16. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2019).  
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one division over its customers in the second division, to the detriment of 
both the customers and its competitors.139  In Qualcomm, the FTC alleged 
that Qualcomm used its market power over premium chipsets to impose 
increased royalty rates in licensing agreements for its SEPs, which reduced 
the OEMs’ willingness to pay for chips from Qualcomm’s rivals.140 
Qualcomm’s economic expert, Dr. Aviv Nevo, testified that the FTC’s 
theory was “just not borne out in actual market data.”141  Dr. Nevo 
explained that according to the FTC’s theory,  Qualcomm’s royalty rates 
should be higher during the time period of its alleged market power in 
CDMA modem chips and premium LTE model chips.142  However, Dr. 
Nevo’s statistical analysis of Qualcomm’s royalty agreements from 1990–
2017 showed there was no economic or meaningful difference between 
royalty rates during the time period of Qualcomm’s alleged market power 
and the royalty rates outside of such period.143  He also presented evidence 
that ex ante royalty rates did not significantly increase upon 
implementation of either the CDMA or LTE standards, which were 
periods when Qualcomm’s market power was allegedly at its apex.144  Dr. 
Nevo also examined industry performance during the time period of 
Qualcomm’s alleged anticompetitive conduct and found that the industry 
had been thriving and was characterized by declining prices and 
skyrocketing quantities.145 
This case is particularly notable in that the FTC’s complaint and 
pretrial brief is built largely on Dr. Shapiro’s bargaining model.146  Yet, 
the district court judge, Judge Lucy Koh—while accepting the FTC’s 
positions and conclusion of harm—never makes a single reference to Dr. 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 761 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 141. Transcript of Proceedings on January 25, 2019 at 1864, FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 
3d 658 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 17-CV-00220). 
 142. Id. at 1866–68. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 1871–75. 
 145. Id. at 1902–03. 
 146. Complaint at 73, FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (N.D. Cal.  2019) (No. 17-CV-
00220) (“the parties’ expectations about the probable outcome of litigation determine the negotiated 
terms.  In this sense, bargaining over royalties and other licensing terms occurs ‘in the shadow of the 
law.’”); Pretrial Brief at 13, Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (No. 17-CV-00220) (“Qualcomm’s 
no license-no chips policy fundamentally alters the bargaining dynamic.  Qualcomm’s monopoly 
power in premium CDMA and premium LTE modem chips means that OEMs would find losing the 
ability to purchase modem chips from Qualcomm extremely costly.  In this setting, basic bargaining 
theory predicts that Qualcomm’s no license-no chips policy, by allowing Qualcomm to bring leverage 
from its market power in modem chips to bear on license negotiations, will lead to royalties that exceed 
the reasonable royalties that Qualcomm would otherwise obtain.”); id. at 12 (“Professor Shapiro will 
provide an economic analysis of Qualcomm’s leverage. Professor Shapiro will explain that, absent its 
no license-no chips policy, Qualcomm would negotiate licenses as other cellular-SEP holder do—in 
the shadow of the law.”). 
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Shapiro’s bargaining model or report in her 233-page opinion.147  Rather, 
Judge Koh largely bases her decision on a legal conclusion that Qualcomm 
has an antitrust duty to deal with rival chipset makers and license its SEPs 
to them.148  This omission of any reference to Dr. Shapiro, his bargaining 
model, or his report suggests, but certainly does not prove, that the district 
court found the bargaining model problematic on some dimension.  It is 
particularly striking because the model’s predictions are consistent with 
her ultimate ruling that Qualcomm’s conduct harmed competitors.149  It 
seems highly probable that, while sympathetic to the model and its 
predictions, the judge felt the model was sufficiently unreliable, that it 
would increase the probability of reversal, and that its inclusion in the 
decision did not outweigh its costs. 
D. FTC v. Advocate Health Care 
In Advocate Health Care, defendants were two hospital networks in 
the northeastern Illinois region, Advocate Health Care Network and 
NorthShore University Health System, that proposed to merge in 2014.150  
The FTC’s economic expert, Dr. Steven Tenn, developed a structural 
model to prove anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger based on 
diversion ratios, margins, and relative prices.151  Notably, Dr. Tenn relied 
on a structural, price-setting model—rather than an explicit bargaining 
model—because, according to the court, “it is easier to understand than a 
bilateral bargaining-based model and certain economic literature, 
including some that specifically addressed the hospital industry, shows 
that the price-setting model and the bilateral bargaining model will 
‘generate identical predicted post-merger price increases.’”152  The 
defense criticized Tenn’s model as inconsistent with commercial realities 
of how prices are set and presented in a standard WTP-bargaining 
model.153  Nonetheless, the court found that Dr. Tenn’s model 
demonstrated that the merger would likely result in anticompetitive harm 
and, additionally, that defendants’ criticisms of the model were superficial 
 
 147. See FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 148. Id. at 760. (“[B]ecause Qualcomm previously licensed its rivals, but voluntarily stopped 
licensing rivals even though doing so was profitable . . . .”); see also Edwards, Ginsburg & Wright, 
supra note 131, at 2. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care, No. 15C11473, 2017 WL 1022015, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2017). 
 151. Id. at *8. 
 152. Id. at *10. 
 153. Id. at *11. 
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and unconvincing.154  In fact, Dr. Tenn criticized the defense’s 
implementation of the WTP-bargaining model and noted that it suffered 
from endogeneity bias and produced implausible results.155  Thus, this case 
is notable because it represents the FTC moving away from its standard 
WTP-bargaining model to a more structural and deterministic model based 
on ease of exposition and reduced computational burden and assumptions.  
Whether this move is specific to this case or perhaps an indicator of a more 
general trend clearly remains to be seen. 
E. Laumann v. National Hockey League 
National Hockey League involves a class action antitrust lawsuit 
challenging the territorial exclusivity of hockey and baseball broadcasting 
implemented by the respective leagues.156  Specifically, plaintiff claimed 
that the National Hockey League (NHL) and Major League Baseball 
(MLB) conspired with regional sports networks (RSNs) to maintain a 
system of “territorial exclusivity” that limited viewing options and 
artificially raised prices.157  Plaintiff’s expert was Dr. Roger Noll, who 
designed an economic model “to simulate how consumers and RSNs 
would behave if territorial restrictions were lifted.”158  In essence, Dr. Noll 
attempted to measure the counterfactual world where RSNs can offer their 
programming a la carte to consumers outside of their specific region.159  
For example, Atlanta Braves broadcasts could be viewed by “out-of-
market” subscribers in the Washington, D.C. area, rather than having these 
consumers rely solely on packages like MLB.tv to watch the Braves.  Dr. 
Noll based his model on Crawford and Yurukoglu160 and examined the 
impact on consumer welfare from unbundling television channels from 
cable packages.161  As part of Dr. Noll’s estimates of the counterfactual 
world, he decided to not model the bargaining process between RSNs and 
MVPDs for the price of their a la carte services;162 rather, he used 
 
 154. Id. at *10. 
 155. Id. at *11.  In one exercise, “Dr. Tenn simulated a merger of all 48 hospitals that Dr. McCarthy 
[the parties’ economic expert] identifies as competing with at least one of defendants’ hospitals. . . .  
Dr. Tenn calculated that, using the defense experts’ mode of analysis, the post-merger price change 
would range from 33% decrease, which is patently absurd, to a modest 6% increase, which is too small 
to be plausible for such a large area.”  Id. 
 156. Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 117 F. Supp. 3d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 157. Id. at 302. 
 158. Id. at 304. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Gregory S. Crawford & Ali Yurukoglu, The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel 
Television Markets, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 643 (2012).  
 161. Laumann, 117 F. Supp. 3d at 304. 
 162. This is in contrast to the analysis performed in Crawford & Yurukoglu, supra note 160. 
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assumptions regarding the state of competition to determine the 
equilibrium price.163 
In assessing a Daubert challenge, Judge Shira Scheindlin was rather 
critical of Dr. Noll’s demand-side analysis to estimate demand for a la 
carte programming.164  However, Judge Scheindlin accepted Dr. Noll’s 
decision to not model bargaining in his supply-side analysis of how RSNs 
and MVPDs would interact.165  Dr. Noll’s rationale for not modeling 
bargaining was that internet delivery of RSN content is a substitute for 
delivery over an MVPD.166  Consequently, MVPDs would have no 
bargaining leverage to mark up prices above the competitive 
equilibrium.167  In essence, all the bargaining leverage is with the RSNs; 
thus, there is no need to model the bargaining process.168  Judge Scheindlin 
emphasized, however: 
By assuming that it is unnecessary to model bargaining between RSNs 
and MVPDs in the BFW [“but-for world”], Dr. Noll is not suggesting 
that no bargaining between the RSNs and MVPDs would occur.  He is 
suggesting that to capture the results of bargaining between RSNs and 
MVPDs in the BFW, it is unnecessary to model the process of 
bargaining.169 
It is unclear how Judge Scheindlin would have ruled if Dr. Noll had 
used a bargaining framework; although, it appears, at least implicitly, there 
is judicial support to avoid the necessity of model bargaining if there are 
alternative, more structural approaches to estimating the result of the 
bargain.  This is similar to Dr. Tenn’s rationale for avoiding the WTP-
bargaining model in Advocate Health Care.170 
F. Behrend v. Comcast 
In Behrend, plaintiffs were cable television subscribers who sued 
Comcast for alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.171  
 
 163. Laumann, 117 F. Supp. 3d at 321. 
 164. Id. at 315. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 321.  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. 
 169. Id.  
 170. See supra Section III.D; see also FTC v. Advocate Health Care, No. 15-11473, 2017 WL 
1022015 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2017). 
 171. Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150, 153 (E.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d, 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 
2011), rev’d, 569 U.S. 27 (2013) (certifying the class despite criticism of most of plaintiffs’ theories 
of anticompetitive harm).  On Comcast’s appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and 
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Plaintiffs offered a bargaining model to outline the harm incurred by cable 
users when a cable operator increases its footprint within a particular 
region through a practice called “clustering.”172  Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. 
Michael Williams, asserted that when a cable provider increases its 
regional strength through clustering, it increases its bargaining power 
when negotiating terms with content providers, such as cable networks.173  
According to Dr. Williams, this increase in bargaining power manifests 
itself in two ways.174  First, he relied on Ken Binmore et al. and theorized 
that with increased clustering, cable networks become relatively less 
patient during negotiations while cable operators become relatively more 
patient and, thus, become more likely to break off negotiations.175  The 
effect is that Comcast would extract more of the bargaining surplus 
because of its greater patience.176  Second, Dr. Williams introduced a novel 
assumption that there is information asymmetry about whether the 
particular cable network has “favorable or unfavorable” advertising 
rates.177  This asymmetry allowed Dr. Williams to arrive at a result where 
Comcast’s greater bargaining power actually resulted in higher prices for 
their end consumers (when we would normally believe lower input costs 
will lower prices assuming some degree of cost pass-through).178 
Judge John Padova agreed with Comcast’s economic experts, Dr. 
David Teece and Dr. Tasneem Chipty, who were highly critical of Dr. 
Williams’ bargaining model—with Dr. Teece calling it “perverse and 
unrealistic.”179  In particular, Judge Padova found Dr. Williams’ 
foundational assumption—that there is information asymmetry on 
advertising rates—to be “wholly unsupported.”180  Further, Judge Padova 
stated that the model was “unsupported by any evidence that cable 
 
appellate court decisions and rejected class certification.  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 
(2013). 
 172. Berhend, 264 F.R.D. at 159.  This is where, through a series of acquisitions or asset swaps 
with other cable providers, a cable provider concentrates its operations in a particular region—in this 
case the Philadelphia “Designated Market Area” (DMA) that included counties in Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, and New Jersey.  Id. at 191. 
 173. Id. at 157–58.  
 174. Id. at 178–80.  
 175. Id. (citing Binmore et al., supra note 48).  
 176. Id. 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. at 179–80.  To arrive at this result, the expert developed a model where, in order to create 
the proper incentive for the cable network to honestly signal whether or not advertising rates are high 
or low, the cable provider will commit to reducing the number of its own end consumers receiving the 
channel via higher cable rates.  Id.  In sum, when the cable provider has greater bargaining power, it 
results in lower input costs but also an incentive to raise prices in order to incentivize the cable network 
to be honest about its adverting rates. 
 179. Id. at 180. 
 180. Id. at 181. 
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operators actually engage in this negotiating conduct” and also 
“unsupported by any empirical evidence.”181  Interestingly, Dr. Williams’ 
attempt to tailor the bargaining model to the specifics of this case—
namely, the assumption regarding information asymmetry on advertising 
rates—was severely criticized by both the defense and the court.182  Most 
likely, it was not the tailoring per se that was problematic but the particular 
choice in tailoring.  Further, it appears that the court was critical of the 
bargaining model even without the particular tailoring. 
While the district court judge ultimately approved certification of a 
class of Comcast subscribers based on a specific claim of antitrust harm—
namely, that clustering deterred entry—it rejected other claims including 
the alleged anticompetitive harm based on the shift in bargaining power 
between Comcast and the cable networks.183  While the Court of Appeals 
affirmed,184 the Supreme Court reversed based on a finding that the class 
was improperly certified because the damages estimated by the plaintiff 
were overly broad and did not narrowly measure the harm from the 
specific aspect of the antitrust claim that was accepted—i.e., that 
clustering deterred entry.185  The Supreme Court’s decision did not weigh 
in on the merits of Dr. Williams’ bargaining model. 
G. United States v. AT&T 
In AT&T, the DOJ alleged that AT&T’s purchase of Time Warner 
would result in anticompetitive harm due to the combination of upstream 
and downstream assets in video programming and distribution.186  
Specifically, inter alia, by combining AT&T’s downstream DirecTV 
division with Time Warner’s upstream Turner networks, this would result 
in higher input costs for rivals to DirecTV—like Dish Network—in the 
form of higher affiliate fees, i.e., the per subscriber per month fee.187  The 
government’s expert, Dr. Carl Shapiro, used a bargaining model to 
estimate the increase in fees likely to result from the vertical integration.188  
Dr. Shapiro posited that the combined company would enjoy increased 
bargaining leverage since the opportunity cost of striking a deal with 
 
 181. Id.  
 182. See, e.g., id. 
 183. Id. at 162–91.  
 184. Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 208 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 185. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 36–38 (2013). 
 186. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 164 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 
(D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 199. 
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DirecTV’s downstream rivals would be higher post-merger.189  The logic 
is that a stronger downstream rival with Turner content diminishes the 
profitability of the DirecTV division.  Put somewhat differently, a long-
term blackout, which would result if Turner content is not carried by rivals, 
is less costly to the combined entity since a blackout would actually help 
the DirecTV division—assuming some positive diversion.190  The purpose 
of Dr. Shapiro’s bargaining model was to quantify the benefits that would 
flow to AT&T from a long-term blackout of Turner content provided by 
AT&T’s competitors.191  Importantly, the point was not to actually predict 
that a long-term blackout would occur, but to illustrate how it would be 
more beneficial to AT&T’s DirecTV post-merger.192  Consequently, this 
increase in benefits would increase Time Warner’s ex ante bargaining 
leverage.193 
In his decision, Judge Richard Leon was clearly convinced that the 
procompetitive aspects of the merger were quite strong.194  Yet his ruling 
in favor of the merger was also highly influenced by his view that the 
bargaining model was inadequate; specifically, he concluded that “the 
Government has failed to clear the first hurdle of showing that the 
proposed merger is likely to increase Turner’s bargaining leverage.”195  
Most of the opinion was devoted to providing support for this conclusion.  
First, Judge Leon emphasized that actual bargaining is innately 
unpredictable.196  Second, he was unconvinced of the strength of the 
bargaining leverage in the first place and concluded that “Turner’s content 
is not literally ‘must have’ in the sense that distributors cannot effectively 
compete without it.  The evidence showed that distributors have 
successfully operated, and continue to operate, without the Turner 
networks or similar programming.”197  This finding obviously discounts 
the actual harm from a blackout. 
Third, Judge Leon found that “to prove its increased-leverage theory, 
 
 189. Id.; see also supra Section II.C. 
 190. Id. at 201. 
 191. Id. at 198. 
 192. Id. at 201. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 164 (“[N]otwithstanding the Government’s concession that this vertical merger would 
result in hundreds of millions of dollars in annual cost savings to AT&T’s customers and 
notwithstanding the fact that (unlike in ‘horizontal’ mergers) no competitor will be eliminated by the 
merger’s proposed vertical integration.”). 
 195. Id. at 199. 
 196. For instance, the judge made note that “Professor Carl Shapiro, recognized . . . that 
‘bargaining is a dark art in many ways,’ Professor Shapiro acknowledged that negotiations may turn 
on [a] myriad [of] ‘unpredictable factors’ . . . .  In short, as Professor Shapiro explained, ‘the real world 
is messy and it’s imperfect.’”  Id. at 171–72. 
 197. Id. at 202. 
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the Government relie[d] upon random statements from defendants’ 
‘ordinary course’ business documents, including employees’ emails and 
internal slide decks.”198  Thus, he believed that these documents lacked the 
weight needed to support the leveraging model.199  This rationale echoes 
skepticism of bargaining models from the courts in VirnetX,200 
Limelight,201 and Behrend.202  Instead, Judge Leon credited the empirical 
evidence offered by the defenses’ economic expert, Dr. Dennis Carlton, 
which showed a lack of price increases from past instances of vertical 
integration.203  Further, he opined that “the integration of programming 
and distribution does not affect affiliate negotiations.”204  Consequently, 
combining the DirecTV and Time Warner divisions would have no impact 
on bargaining leverage.205  Finally, according to Judge Leon, even if he 
accepted the bargaining model, “the evidence is also insufficient to support 
the input values upon which [Shapiro] relied to generate his predictions of 
harms.”206 
 
 198. Id. at 208. 
 199. Id. at 210 (“[T]his is not a case containing direct, probative evidence of anticompetitive intent 
on the part of high-level executives within the merging company.”); id. at 212 (“Much of the third-
party competitor testimony [the judge] heard consisted of speculative concerns regarding how the 
witnesses thought Turner might act in negotiations after the merger.”); id. at 214 (“[T]he record is 
barren of any contentions by the third-party competitors that they would actually give in to any price 
increases demanded by Turner as a result of its purported increase in post-merger leverage.”). 
 200. VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 201. Limelight Networks v. XO Commc’ns, No. 3:15-CV-720, 2018 WL 678245 (E.D. Va. Feb. 
2, 2018). 
 202. Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 203. United States v. AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 215–17 (D.C.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 
(D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 204. Id. at 218. 
 205. Commentators have been particularly critical of this finding that negotiators do not consider 
other divisions or units of a company when bargaining.  See, e.g., Salop supra note 52, at 462.  While 
the court does offer some evidentiary support for this judgement (e.g., testimony of negotiating 
executives), it can run counter to standard economic models of profit maximization which assume 
maximization occurs over the entire suite of products and divisions at a firm.  Id.  On appeal, the D.C. 
Circuit also highlights this as a potentially problematic aspect of the decision—particularly the failure 
to cite Copperweld Corp. v. Independent Tube Co., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984), which effectively upheld 
the principle that a business with multiple divisions will maximize corporate-wide profits. United 
States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2019).  That being said, Amicus for 37 
Economists provides economic arguments in support of the court’s ruling.  Brief Amici Curiae of 37 
Economists, Antitrust Scholars, and Former Government Antitrust Officials Supporting Appellees and 
Supporting Affirmance at 17, United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (No. 18-5214) (“[M]ulti-
division firms face a multitude of decisions about when to exercise centralized control and when to 
allow divisions to operate in a decentralized manner.”). 
 206. AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 221.  The court spends a considerable portion of the opinion 
detailing the weaknesses of the inputs used in the bargaining model.  See id. passim.  Ultimately, 
however, the judge’s logic does not rest on the quality of the inputs but rather on the credibility of 
whether or not bargaining leverage materially increases post-merger.  See infra Part IV.  This would 
be consistent with the court in Limelight, which stated that the issue was not whether or not the “right” 
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On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s ruling 
and, in particular, stated that Judge Leon did not misunderstand or 
misapply the Nash bargaining theory.207  Rather, the court reiterated much 
of the same arguments that Judge Leon relied upon, including the fact that 
plaintiff’s bargaining model “failed to take into account Turner Broadcast 
System’s post-litigation irrevocable offers of no-blackout arbitration 
agreements.”208  Further, the court cited VirtnetX: “As one circuit has put 
it, ‘[t]he Nash theorem arrives at a result that follows from a certain set of 
premises,’ while the theory ‘asserts nothing about what situations in the 
real world fit those premises.’”209  In sum, the court stated “the record 
shows that the district court accepted the Nash bargaining theory as an 
economic principle generally but rejected its specific prediction in light of 
the evidence that the district court credited.”210 
IV. WHAT ROLE SHOULD BARGAINING MODELS PLAY IN ANTITRUST 
CASES? 
Given the overview of recent cases involving bargaining models, it is 
clear that court adoption, interpretation, and evidentiary requirements have 
been uneven at best.  We can broadly divide the previously discussed set 
of cases into three categories: (1) cases determining counterfactual patent 
royalties; (2) cases involving horizontal mergers of hospitals; and (3) cases 
involving vertical integration in media markets.  In this Part, we comment 
on the courts’ treatment of bargaining models within the context of each 
category to determine how bargaining models were assessed.  We 
particularly focus on the bargaining model used in AT&T and find that the 
court’s logic in rejecting the predictions of increased bargaining leverage 
are well founded under certain assumptions. 
A. Patent Royalty Counterfactuals 
In both VirnetX and Limelight, the courts were asked to determine the 
counterfactual royalty amount for certain patents.211  This involved 
assessing whether Nash’s bargaining model led to reliable predictions for 
 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) was used to calibrate relative bargaining patience but 
whether the WACC measure was relevant at all to understand the bargaining outcome.  Limelight, 
2018 WL 678245, at *3. 
 207. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1039–40 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 208. Id. at 1031. 
 209. Id. at 1039 (alteration in original) (quoting VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Virnetx, 767 F.3d at 1325–26; Limelight, 2018 WL 678245, at *2. 
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counterfactual negotiations.  These cases illustrate that courts can struggle 
with some of the abstractions necessary to model the bargaining 
outcome—such as the central Nash bargaining assumption of equal 
bargaining power.  In Limelight, attempts to refine the Nash bargaining 
assumption and tailor the bargaining power estimate to particulars of the 
case actually resulted in greater judicial skepticism.212  Given the 
somewhat singular focus of the courts in both VirnetX and Limelight in 
determining the adequacy of the bargaining model, it appears that the 
burden is perhaps higher in cases where the primary exercise is to 
determine the counterfactual royalty amount that would have emerged in 
some hypothetical bargaining situation.213  The two courts were reticent to 
engage in hypothetical exercises where the underlying assumptions were 
not properly developed and justified.214  Yet, that is the essence of 
economic modeling, which necessarily involves abstractions and 
simplifications.  But ultimately, the power of models lie in their ability to 
predict outcomes.  Thus, any theoretical model based on abstractions and 
simplifications will suffer the from the critique of the Limelight court that 
“it relies on an expert’s willingness to offer an opinion on what would have 
occurred in a negotiation that did not occur and never would have 
occurred, since the parties show no willingness to negotiate.”215  Yet, 
behind the court’s rejection of the particular bargaining model is an 
important premise: the parties were allegedly unwilling to negotiate.”216  
This premise may or may not be accurate, given the facts of the case, but 
its accuracy could be further developed with evidence.  Thus, the Limelight 
court was perhaps a bit heavy-handed in its criticism of economic 
abstractions, but it was also potentially justified in questioning the premise 
that the parties would be negotiating at all. 
Qualcomm clearly represents a very different case than VirnetX and 
Limelight because, while it involved patent royalties, it was in the context 
of SEPs, FRAND, and alleged monopoly power in certain types of 
 
 212. Limelight, 2018 WL 678245, at *3 (stating that the expert’s use of relative patience, from 
Rubinstein, to measure bargaining power was no better than “fancy guesswork”); see also Rubinstein, 
supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 213. This is in contrast to horizontal and vertical mergers where courts are weighing a plethora of 
other factors including market definition, multiple theories of harm, entry, and efficiencies.  
Specifically, to the extent bargaining models are used to predict competitive harm, it is weighed along 
with other evidence that inform this question including documents, testimony, and other empirical 
evidence.  In other words, bargaining models are generally not the only piece of evidence used to 
prove anticompetitive harm in merger cases. 
 214. See, e.g., supra Sections III.A–B. 
 215. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. XO Commc’ns, LLC, No. 3:15-CV-720, 2018 WL 678245, at *2 
(E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 2018). 
 216. Id.  
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chipsets.217  Consequently, Qualcomm lacks a singular focus in 
determining the counterfactual patent royalty.  As noted previously, Judge 
Koh ultimately agreed with the conclusion of anticompetitive conduct; 
however, she did not rely on the FTC expert’s bargaining model or expert 
report.218  At the very least, this reasonably suggests that there is judicial 
discomfort with basing a finding of anticompetitive harm on a bargaining 
framework—even if used merely to support or corroborate evidence.  As 
the court in VirnetX indicated, although courts appear to routinely accept 
Nash bargaining models and assumptions to determine counterfactual 
patent royalties, the acceptance is uneven; furthermore, some courts have 
outright rejected the Nash bargaining models.219  Thus, the question is not 
necessarily related to the quality of the inputs used in the model, but 
whether the entire model is appropriate at all.220 
B. Hospital Merger Cases 
Within antitrust jurisprudence, the most common use and acceptance 
of bargaining models occurs in horizontal hospital merger cases.  In some 
sense, plaintiffs’ successful use of bargaining models in hospital mergers 
is the gold standard by which all other models are assessed.  However, in 
Advocate Health Care, the FTC did not use the WTP-bargaining model—
which the defendants actually utilized221—but rather, used a structural 
model that did not rely on bargaining assumptions.222  In fact, commenting 
on the analysis used in the case, the FTC’s economic expert, Dr. Tenn 
stated: 
There are, of course, multiple ways of undertaking a merger simulation.  
For example, one alternative approach that the FTC could have 
employed was a Price-Willingness to Pay (WTP) regression, which 
seeks to estimate the relationship between price and a measure of 
 
 217. See FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 17-CV-00220, 2018 WL 5848999 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018). 
 218. See supra Section III.C and accompanying text.  
 219. See Limelight Networks, 2018 WL 5848999, at *2.  
 220. While a discussion of empirical support of the predictions of Nash’s bargaining models is 
beyond the scope of this article, there certainly is some evidence that Nash’s bargaining model is a 
poor predictor of real-world outcomes.  See, e.g., HANS J.M. PETERS, AXIOMATIC BARGAINING GAME 
THEORY 13 (1992) (“Empirical evidence for the Nash bargaining solution certainly is not 
overwhelming . . . .  Further, many experiments have been conducted—see Roth and Malouf (1979) 
for an overview—but also these are not unambiguously conclusive in favor of the Nash solution. Even, 
earlier experiments by Crott (1971) point in the direction of the next popular solution, the Raiffa-
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.”). 
 221. FTC v. Advocate Health Care, No. 15-C-11473, 2017 WL 1022015 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2017).  
 222. See id.  The approach that Dr. Tenn utilized was based on Gaynor et al., which is based on a 
differentiated Bertrand model.  See Martin S. Gaynor et al., A Structural Approach to Market 
Definition with an Application to the Hospital Industry, 61 J. INDUS. ECON. 243 (2013). 
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bargaining leverage by predicting the change in price that would occur 
from the parties’ increased bargaining leverage postmerger.  But 
employing this regression risked raising complicated econometric issues 
that would have been difficult to resolve in this case and was therefore 
not the analysis the FTC’s economic expert considered most 
appropriate.223 
Of course, econometric problems are not problems with the bargaining 
model per se, but it suggests that the data requirements to implement 
hospital bargaining models are not trivial and can expose the expert to a 
great deal of criticism. 
Importantly, recent research by a former FTC economist, Christopher 
Garmon, indicates that use of the WTP-bargaining model as a screening 
device to identify presumptively anticompetitive hospital mergers—
although superior to simply looking at market concentration—has a fairly 
high error rate in predicting post-merger price changes when combined 
with merger simulation.224  Garmon’s study is the first comprehensive 
examination of the various predictive tools used for hospital mergers in a 
large sample of mergers.225  It is important to note that Garmon’s paper 
only focuses on the WTP tool as a screening device with data that is 
typically available early in an investigation rather than as a tool during a 
full phase investigation when potentially more data is used.  Using a 
sample of 28 hospital mergers, Garmon found that the WTP screen 
correctly identified 7 of the 9 mergers that resulted in significant price 
increases;226 although, that means the WTP screen had a false negative 
(type II error) in 2 of the 9 mergers.227  Further, of the 19 non-problematic 
mergers, the WTP screen correctly identified 12 of the 19;228 thus, it 
triggered a false positive (type I error) for 7 of the 19 cases.229  In total, the 
WTP screen correctly identified the direction of the ultimate price effect 
for 19 of the 28 mergers (67.9 percent)230 and incorrectly identified the 
direction for 9 of the 28 mergers (32.1 percent).231  To account for the fact 
that some of the false positives could be due to eventual cost savings, 
 
 223. Tenn & Vandergrift, supra note 65, at 6 n.24. 
 224. Garmon, supra note 10, at 1097.  Garmon states that “it is important to emphasize that the 
screens are being evaluated to determine how well they identify mergers that warrant further 
investigation, not how well they identify anticompetitive mergers in isolation from other evidence.”  
Id. at 1087. 
 225. Id. at 1097. 
 226. Id. at 1089 & tbl.3. 
 227. Id. tbl.3. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
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Garmon dropped mergers that resulted in variable cost savings.232  The 
results still show a significant percentage of false positives and 
negatives.233  Ultimately, Garmon found that “WTP . . . leave[s] a great 
deal of unexplained variation in the price changes, even excluding mergers 
with cost savings. . . .  This highlights that methods that approximate the 
lost competition from a merger like WTP . . . may miss some merger 
effects that impact price.”234  Specifically, WTP is “useful for flagging 
mergers for further investigation, but not for identifying anticompetitive 
mergers on [its] own apart from other evidence. . . .  WTP-based merger 
simulation performs poorly at predicting post-merger price changes, but 
this may be due to the limited data available to calibrate the simulation in 
an initial investigation.”235 
Again, because the focus of Garmon’s research is on WTP (and other 
measures) as a screening tool, caution must be exercised in extrapolating 
too much from the results.  Nonetheless, retrospective studies like 
Garmon’s are tremendously useful in giving some empirical validity to 
bargaining models such as WTP, which are used routinely in agencies and 
courts.  The takeaway is that these models can result in a significant 
percentage of false positives and negatives.  Consequently, courts and 
practitioners should certainly seek to determine whether the WTP-
bargaining model is appropriate in the particular merger at hand. 
C. Bargaining Models in Vertical Mergers in Media Markets 
Although bargaining models, and their structural variants, are well 
accepted by courts in horizontal hospital mergers, this is certainly not the 
case for media markets.  In Laumann, the court appeared to offer judicial 
support for avoiding the necessity of bargaining models if alternative 
approaches are available.236  In Behrend, the district court was highly 
critical of the bargaining model used by the plaintiff to measure the harm 
incurred by cable users when a cable operator increases its footprint within 
a particular region, i.e., “clustering.”237  Further, the court found the 
bargaining model had no empirical support and was “perverse” given 
 
 232. Id. at 1089. 
 233. According to Garmon, there are seventeen mergers without variable cost savings.  Id. tbl.4.  
Of those seventeen, eight have a significant post-merger price increase.  Id.  The WTP measure fails 
to identify two of the eight.  Id.  Further, the WTP measure improperly flags two of the nine 
nonproblematic mergers.  Id.  
 234. Id. at 1093. 
 235. Id. at 1097. 
 236. See Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 117 F. Supp. 3d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).  
 237. See Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
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certain assumptions made by the expert.238 
While bargaining models were used extensively by the FCC in the 
Comcast-NBCU matter, the case was settled and, thus, we have no direct 
insight into how a court would have received the bargaining model 
developed in that case.  We do have an indirect insight, however, because 
AT&T-Time Warner involved a very similar bargaining model.239 
Ultimately, in AT&T, Judge Leon’s rationale for rejecting the 
bargaining model came down to finding a “low likelihood of a long-term 
Turner blackout.”240  Judge Leon emphasized that mere possibilities of 
blackout are insufficient, rather, the threat of a blackout must be 
credible.241  The issue of credibility was also directly addressed by the 
D.C. Circuit.242  In this Part, we walk through the judge’s reasoning for 
rejecting the predictions of the bargaining model—focusing on the issue 
of blackout credibility. 
We start by focusing on the district court’s belief that the evidence 
strongly showed that the goal of Turner networks was to increase 
distribution as widely as possible.243  Judge Leon cited Turner Chairman 
and CEO John Martin who stated, “our goal is to have our networks in 
front of as many eyeballs as possible.”244  Judge Leon summarized the 
testimony in this area by stating, “[f]or that reason, Turner executives aim 
to achieve wide distribution of their networks,”245 because “wide 
distribution maximizes programmers’ two income streams––affiliate fees 
and advertising revenue.”246 
With his focus on wide distribution, Judge Leon properly emphasized 
that Turner network channels are two-sided platforms, although he did not 
use this specific terminology.247  Two-sided platforms, including ad-
 
 238. Id. at 180. 
 239. See supra notes 156–82 and accompanying text. 
 240. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 207 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 
(D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 241. Id. at 223. 
 242. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[W]hether the threat of 
long-term blackouts would be credible, as posited by the government’s increased leverage theory.”). 
 243. AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 169. 
 244. Id. at 168. 
 245. Id. at 169 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 246. Id. at 171. 
 247. Id. at 195.  Two-sided platforms, such as radio and television stations, bring two “sides” or 
groups together, such as viewers and advertisers, on a common platform, e.g., a specific television 
channel.  Platforms are characterized by the existence of cross-group effects, or indirect network 
effects, which are triggered when the presence and size of one group, e.g., viewers, attracts members 
of the other group, e.g., advertisers.  The cross-group effects do not necessarily need to be symmetrical 
or even positive in both directions—but it needs to be positive in at least one direction.  See, e.g., Jean-
Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 
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supported channels, attempt to unlock indirect network effects, or cross-
group effects, through wide distribution of their products.248  As 
viewership increases, this attracts advertisers and increases adverting 
rates.  Importantly, part of the efficiency justification for the deal is that 
the advertising will become more targeted and efficient.249  If so, then the 
expected return to advertising will increase post-merger if there is an 
increase in advertising rates.250  Consequently, the post-merger incentive 
to increase distribution is even higher. 
This recognition of the importance of advertising revenue is further 
illustrated by Judge Leon, who reasoned that “[n]umerous witnesses 
explained, and Professor Shapiro acknowledged, that a long-term blackout 
of Turner content, even post-merger, would cause Turner to lose more in 
affiliate fee and advertising revenues than the merged entity would 
gain.”251  Further, “[u]nlike the car seller, who might be ‘willing to walk 
away’ and accept his alternative offer to sell the car for a gain . . . the 
evidence at trial indicated that Turner would not be willing to accept the 
‘catastrophic’ affiliate fee and advertising losses associated with a long-
term blackout.”252 
Questioning the credibility of the blackout threat is further bolstered 
by the parties’ commitment to offer baseball-style arbitration for licensing 
disputes.253  As part of the terms of the arbitration, Turner must continue 
to supply content during dispute periods, thus, “the commitment 
guarantees that no blackout of Turner content can occur once arbitration 
is invoked.”254  This is a highly key consideration because this structurally 
eliminates the primary engine behind consumer harm from bargaining 
models.  Without the increased opportunity cost from striking a deal, there 
is no change in incentives; consequently, there is also no change in 
bargaining leverage since the possibility of a blackout has been eliminated.  
 
990 (2003); David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. 
REG. 325 (2003). 
 248. See, e.g., David S. Evans, What Times-Picayune Tells Us About the Antitrust Analysis of 
Attention Platforms, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2019, at 1, 3 (“Platforms set prices recognizing 
that there is a feedback loop connecting the two sides.  That results in their balancing prices between 
the two sides in a way that ensures that they have enough participants on each side to create value for 
those on the other side.  Commonly, platforms set prices below cost on one side, because they can 
charge the other side more to get access to those on the subsidized side.”). 
 249. AT&T, 310 F. Supp 3d at 254.  “AT&T will also, with their customers’ permission, use 
consumer data to develop targeted ads, thereby increasing the value of Time Warner’s ad inventory.”  
Id. at 183. 
 250. See, e.g., id. at 182 (“AT&T’s digital, data-driven advertising prices are 60% higher than 
Nielsen-based ads because the former have ‘finer demographics that are offered for targeting.’”). 
 251. Id. at 223. 
 252. Id. at 223 n.35. 
 253. Id. at 217. 
 254. Id. at 184. 
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Thus, it is perfectly consistent with the bargaining model to incorporate 
this structural constraint as well. 
In sum, what appears to lie behind Judge Leon’s dismissal of the 
DOJ’s theory of harm is the fundamental rejection of a change in the 
Turner networks’ post-merger bargaining leverage.255  As previously 
mentioned, television channels like the Turner networks seek wide 
distribution to maximize their return on advertising revenue, which is 
based in large part on the number of viewers.256  Further, since Judge Leon 
fully embraced the procompetitive aspects of the merger—including the 
synergies involved with more efficient advertising—those returns would 
only be higher post-merger.257  This consideration actually drives down the 
post-merger bargaining leverage.  Thus, coupled with the arbitration 
agreement, the criticisms against Judge Leon—based on erroneous 
assertions or misunderstandings of bargaining models—are inaccurate.  
That being said, both the district court and the D.C. Circuit discuss the 
“credibility” of a blackout threat, which is a bit of an imprecision.258  The 
issue is more about changes in bargaining leverage and whether that 
change is materially different post-merger (and reliability calculated). 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
If we assume that the best outside option during negotiations between 
upstream channels and downstream programming distributors is a 
blackout, then mergers such as Comcast-NBCU and AT&T-Time Warner 
will always exhibit upward pricing pressure—regardless of the level of 
market power upstream or downstream.259  This is effectively a “built-in” 
result from use of bargaining models in the context of vertical mergers.  It 
is important to note that this does not necessarily mean a predicted post-
merger price increase since efficiencies have not been accounted for; 
although, it certainly changes the evidentiary debate if all vertical mergers 
involving bargaining have an upward pricing pressure. 
The mechanical use of bargaining models in this manner is effectively 
the same as applying a vGUPPI to all vertical mergers.  While there has 
been some recent advocacy to incorporate vGUPPIs into a desired revision 
of the vertical merger guidelines,260 the FTC’s draft 2020 Vertical Merger 
 
 255. Id. at 207.  
 256. Id. at 171. 
 257. Id. at 195. 
 258. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 259. See supra Section II.C. 
 260. See Salop, supra note 52, at 459.   
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Guidelines did not include vGUPPIs.261  Further, the antitrust agencies do 
not appear to routinely incorporate vGUPPIs into assessments of vertical 
mergers.262  The question is why?  As discussed below, a number of recent 
papers examine the feasibility and predictive qualities of vGUPPIs (and, 
by extension, bargaining models that generalize the vGUPPI result). 
Margaret Slade reviewed the usefulness of vGUPPIs in antitrust 
matters and found that “[a] vertical GUPPI, while sharing the 
disadvantages of the horizontal GUPPI, [loses] some of its advantages.”263  
The primary disadvantages are (i) the informational requirements are 
higher because information must be obtained on non-merging rivals, 
which requires who exactly are the rivals (which invokes relevant product 
market considerations); (ii) three vGUPPI calculations are necessary 
rather than one; and (iii) one of the vGUPPI calculations requires a vector 
of cost passthroughs.264  Given these shortcomings, Slade concludes that 
“vertical GUPPIs should not be used as screening tools, that is, as tools for 
deciding which mergers warrant further investigation.”265  While 
acknowledging that, for contested mergers, vGUPPIs can be useful—they 
must be considered simultaneously with the elimination of EDM 
according to the work of Gopal Das Varma and Martino De Stefano.266 
Gopal Das Varma and Martino De Stefano developed a bargaining 
model for vertical mergers that integrates the incentive to raise rivals’ costs 
(RRC) through a change in bargaining leverage (or, as a special case, the 
vGUPPI) with the elimination of EDM.267  They found that “standard” 
bargaining models that do not explicitly and jointly model these two 
concepts results in errant price predictions.268  For instance, a standard 
bargaining model “assumes that the merging downstream firm’s retail 
price, and the rival’s output, remain at their pre-merger levels.  Thus, the 
calculation ignores the demand shift effect that stems from EDM.”269  
 
 261. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, DRAFT VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
(2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1561715/p810034vertical 
mergerguidelinesdraft.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WA8-3L74]. 
 262. See, e.g., Int’l Competition Network, ICN Vertical Mergers Survey Report, at 16 (2018), 
https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/MWG_Surveyreport 
VerticalMergers2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6Q5-M3HU] (“vGUPPI, on the other hand, is 
infrequently used: 29 out of 40 [National Competition Authorities] indicated have never used this 
technique.”). 
 263. Margaret Slade, Vertical Mergers: Ex Post Evidence and Ex Ante Evaluation Methods 11 
(Vancouver Sch. of Econ., Working Paper, 2020). 
 264. Id. at 11–12. 
 265. Id. at 12. 
 266. See generally Das Varma & De Stefano, supra note 10. 
 267. Id. at 2–3. 
 268. Id. at 19. 
 269. Id. at 11. 
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Further, they found that different assumptions regarding relative 
bargaining power can actually result in different post-merger price change 
predictions.270 
Using a different methodology, Gleb Domnenko and David Sibley 
also examined the ability of vGUPPIs to accurately predict post-merger 
price changes.271  Specifically, they compared Monte Carlo merger 
simulations with the predictions from vGUPPIs.  They concluded that, 
“[g]iven these simulation results, we calculate vGUPPI indices in two 
alternative ways and find that they are not useful predictors of the 
directions upstream prices take after a vertical merger.  vGUPPIs for the 
upstream price to be paid by the remaining downstream rival always 
predict increases, whereas in 58 percent of the simulations, the upstream 
price falls after the merger.”272  While vGUPPIs are not identical to recent 
bargaining models used in vertical mergers, as detailed in Section II.C, 
they are close cousins—particularly in their built-in prediction of upward 
pricing pressure from all vertical mergers.273  Consequently, the criticisms 
of vGUPPI also generally apply to vertical bargaining models. 
Our review of the use of bargaining models in prior antitrust cases is 
not intended to dismiss the usefulness of bargaining models in antitrust.  
Rather, a degree of caution is required when using a bargaining model in 
a manner that does not fit its actual scope.  Bargaining models allow us to 
gain important insights and inferences from a process that inherently is 
difficult to predict.  There are a variety of factors that influence the 
direction of the prediction.  Game theory is a powerful tool that has 
tremendous applications both within economics and outside of economics.  
Yet, according to Drew Fudenberg and David Levine, there are 
circumstances when “game theory does a poor job empirically: for 
example, when equilibria are not robust, the environment is complex, or 
when circumstances are unfamiliar, standard game theory is less likely to 
perform well in the sense of making too wide a range of predictions.”274  
When properly assessed, this divergence between theoretical predictions 
and empirical results suggests that the theory is only as good as the 
underlying assumptions; and often, what is required are refinements and 
developments in the theory to conform to the empirical realities.275  
 
 270. Id. at 12–13. 
 271. See generally Domnenko & Sibley, supra note 10. 
 272. Id. at 4. 
 273. Id. at 16. 
 274. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning 
in Games, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 153 (2016). 
 275. See DAVID K. LEVINE & JIE ZHANG, HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMIC 
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Further, Luke Froeb et al. explain that “predictions are sensitive to a 
particular bargaining model’s assumptions.  This raises the question of 
reliability of the predictions in merger cases: When predictions depend on 
assumptions, it is important to determine how well the particular model 
‘fits’ the case or industry to which it is applied.”276 
In sum, bargaining models certainly have a useful place in a 
competition agency’s toolkit to predict the effects of mergers or various 
unilateral conduct; however, their use should be limited by fact-specific 
evidence.  Economists relying on bargaining models to advance theories 
of harm must ensure that the model is built on robust assumptions about 
how the industry actually operates.  If a model makes predictions that are 
plainly contradicted by real world data, one must ask whether something 
is wrong with the model.  We find that Judge Leon’s opinion in AT&T277 
is a good example of how to balance complex modeling against other 
evidence.  Judges should carefully examine theoretical models alongside 
other economic and testimonial evidence to determine whether the model 
accounts for and holds up against market realities.278 
Further, even if a model is applicable, the estimates of the effects are 
only as accurate as the inputs used.  While this is an obvious point, it is 
worth emphasizing that EDM and efficiencies are central to most vertical 
mergers.279  Consequently, the estimated magnitudes of both the harm and 
efficiencies are particularly important to accurately assess in order to make 
reliable predictions.  A key aspect of the DOJ’s bargaining model in AT&T 
involved measuring the rate of subscriber loss from content distributors 
(such as Dish Network) in the face of higher content costs from Turner 
channels such as TBS and TNT.280  The court rightly wrestled over the 
accuracy and reliability of the measure presented by the DOJ—as this was 
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a key input to measure the change in the post-merger bargaining strength 
of AT&T.281 
Ultimately, we find that judges are not rejecting the Nash bargaining 
model per se, but are rejecting its application to a particular matter and its 
predictive power given the specific set of facts and information 
requirements.  This is an important distinction. 
 
 
 281. See id. 
